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The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the 
LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part V 
MARC SPINDELMAN* 
I. THE SHOWER’S MEMORY—THEN AND NOW1 
For a long time now, the shower has occupied a significant place in the U.S. 
cultural archive, and a highly fraught one in the sub-archive of the LGBT-related 
Kulturkampf.2 After its seeming disappearance from prominence for a number 
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Making all this all the more remarkable is its arrival amidst a global pandemic. The same 
holds for the decision by the Ohio State Law Journal to give the work a home and then to 
bring it to press at breakneck speed. As a reminder of some of these realities in the United 
States alone, as of the day of publication at least 129,947 have lost their lives because of the 
coronavirus, both outside and inside the LGBTQIA communities. COVID-19 Dashboard by 
the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU), 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited July 6, 
2020).  
 1 Earlier parts of this work appear as Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial 
Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part I, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 81 
(2020); Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex 
Discrimination Cases, Part II, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 87 (2020) [hereinafter Spindelman, 
The Shower’s Return, Part II]; Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on 
the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part III, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 101 (2020) 
[hereinafter Spindelman, The Shower’s Return, Part III]; and Marc Spindelman, The 
Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part IV, 
81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 117 (2020) [hereinafter Spindelman, The Shower’s Return, Part 
IV]. 
 2 An important aspect of the U.S. cultural archive and the sub-archive of LGBT-related 
Kulturkampf is how the shower scene involved in the LGBT Title VII cases traces a 
genealogy that moves to and through the history and cultural politics of struggles for cis-
women’s sex equality rights, including the national conversation over the Equal Rights 
Amendment, which famously featured both bathrooms and same-sex marriage among the 
reasons the measure did not become part of the federal Constitution on the timeline many 
had hoped for. These items are tracked, with some key sources on sex-segregated 
restrooms—not showers—in Ruth Colker, Public Restrooms: Flipping the Default Rules, 78 
OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 146–57 (2017) (discussing the “history of the public restroom,” and noting 
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years, its reemergence in a central position in the LGBT Title VII sex 
discrimination cases can stir a complex range of collective and individual 
memories, including traumas associated with how the shower worked to closet 
and bring ruin to lesbian women’s and gay men’s lives, prominently, but not 
exclusively, the professional lives of lesbian and gay military servicemembers 
who were prevented from openly serving the nation as who they were and are 
until that military ban was fully lifted less than a decade ago.3 The re-emergence 
of the shower scene in the LGBT Title VII litigation, its structural elements 
basically still intact, testifies not merely to a certain lack of creative imagination 
by foes of LGBT rights arguing before the Supreme Court, but also to the 
profound ways the shower continues to exert a powerful hold on our nation’s 
cultural and symbolic life in the areas of sex, gender, sexual difference, and 
inequality. Evidently, the shower still can set pro-LGBT and anti-LGBT mind-
bodies ablaze, if in very different ways. 
As a cultural reference point with a track record of meaningful, if ultimately 
historically limited, success, the shower scene is intensely regulatory in its 
operations. Translated from a fantasy depiction into a real-time governance rule, 
its function is to reflect and reinforce, hence yield, structurally hierarchical 
arrangements of power, including state power, that position certain bodies with 
authority over others, managing which bodies may go where and with what 
attendant qualities of life.4  
 
how it is inflected by “considerations of race, class, moralism, and gender”). Mary Anne 
Case’s work on bathrooms and sex discrimination is a vital passage point when thinking on 
the topic. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation, in 
TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 211 (Harvey Molotch & Laura 
Noren eds., 2010). For other, more gay-inflected aspects of this history, see GEORGE 
CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY 
MALE WORLD 1890–1940, at 207–25 (1994) (notes on bathhouses); id. at 475 (entry for 
“Tearoom (washroom) trade”). See also generally Lee Edelman, Men’s Room, in STUD: 
ARCHETECTURES OF MASCULINITY 152 (Joel Sanders ed., 1996); Lee Edelman, Tearooms 
and Sympathy, or, the Epistemology of the Water Closet, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES 
READER 553 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).  
 3 See generally Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 
Stat. 3515 (2010); Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on 
the Repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (Sept. 20, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
the-press-office/2011/09/20/statement-president-repeal-dont-ask-dont-tell [https://perma.cc 
/R8BS-PNBR]. A timeline is provided by Clay Flaherty, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Timeline, 
JURIST (Sept. 20, 2011), https://www.jurist.org/archives/timelines/dont-ask-dont-tell/ 
[https://perma.cc/ ZX7N-WTMR]. “Seeming” is crucial here, given how, although many 
people may have missed it, the shower played its part in the Trump Administration’s still 
ongoing ban on trans military service. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY SERVICE BY TRANSGENDER PERSONS 28–31 
(Feb. 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Mar/23/2001894037/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-
SERVICE-BY-TRANSGENDER-INDIVIDUALS.PDF [https://perma.cc/55KQ-HXJG] 
(discussing “separate berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities”).  
 4 For a turn-around, see infra text accompanying note 35. 
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The elemental building blocks of the shower scene, like the rules of haircare 
as Elle Woods once described them, are both “simple and finite.”5 First comes 
a basically heroic normative figure naked in a shower—regularly imagined not 
in the singular but in the plural. Then, in dramatic relief, comes the scene’s 
villain, illegitimately invading the space and claiming it as “his” own. If today’s 
protagonists are heroines, cis and impliedly straight women, in the 1990’s gays-
in-the-military debates, they were our nation’s fighting finest: heterosexual men, 
military troops. Today’s villain, a trans woman, misgendered as in John 
Bursch’s commentary as a man “who identifies as a woman” but who “looks 
like a man,”6 has taken over the role once occupied by her older gay male 
brother, not a limp-wristed pansy who’d never graduate from basic training, but, 
like the lethal, low-voiced sexually insane criminal the trans woman has been 
phobically figured to be, a menacing homosexual male alpha dog trained to 
attack and to kill other men.7 Constructed this way by the U.S. military, this 
homosexual’s homosexuality was thought to make him, at least when he was 
naked in the shower with other men, an unpredictable social “other” who 
couldn’t be guaranteed to remain squarely inside the conventional lines of 
military discipline and order. In the showers, perhaps elsewhere, his own inner 
sexual monster, possessed of the assets of military training, could come out. 
There’s nothing especially remarkable about the shower scene—then and 
now, a temporal gap that traumas associated with it may collapse—representing 
gay men and trans women in a homologous light. However erroneously and 
problematically, states of sexual and gender abjection regularly make those 
occupying them seem indistinguishable, as seen from certain vantage points 
occupied by those in dominant social groups that manifest these forms of 
otherness from which their own status is superordinately marked.8  
 
 5 LEGALLY BLONDE 1:27:38 (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001). 
 6 Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. 
EEOC, No. 18-107 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/2019/18107_4gcj.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X32-Y5GT] [hereinafter 
Harris Funeral Homes Transcript]. 
 7 For the image, see Spindelman, The Showers Return, Part IV, supra note 1, at 125–
27 (discussing The Silence of the Lambs). A normative vision of men-loving-men soldiers, 
including as an historical force, is in PLATO, Symposium, in LYSIS • SYMPOSIUM • GORGIAS 
73, 103 (W.R.M. Lamb trans., 2001) (1925) (discussing the prospects of an army made up 
of same-sex “lovers and their favourites”); id. at n.1 (noting “there was such a ‘sacred 
band’ . . . at Thebes, which distinguished itself at Leuctra (371 B.C.)”). 
 8 This fungibility is undoubtedly now neoliberal in certain respects, but it also has a 
history in which what are now known as lesbian, gay, and trans identities, widely, if not 
universally understood to refer to very different and very specifically different types of 
people and ways of life, were located under larger overarching headings. See, e.g., Henry 
Rubin, The Logic of Treatment, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 482, 483 (Susan 
Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006) (“‘Sexual inversion’ referred to a broad range of 
cross-gender behavior (in which males behaved like women and vice-versa) of which 
homosexual desire was only a logical but indistinct aspect, while ‘homosexuality’ focused 
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The interchangeability of male and female heterosexual bodies in the 
shower scene is a puzzle of a different order. It’s striking, and nearly astounding, 
recalling the shower scene’s place in the wider setting of anti-LGBT rights 
discourses, which have long spotlighted the threats of homosexuality and more 
recently the threats of trans people to the ostensibly objective factual 
unavoidability, the rock bottom non-negotiability, of male-female sex 
difference. But there it is just the same. 
Practically, male-female fungibility in this setting serves to construct the 
terms of a still socially-dominant gendered and sexualized identity—cis-
heterosexuality—as defining a state of subjectivity that’s simultaneously 
socially innocent and besieged by forces that ideologies of cis-heterosexual 
superiority exist in contrast to, both (to use their old labels) “homosexuality” 
and “transsexualism” being constructivist terms that are part of bids to identify, 
regulate, and dominate these figures.9 As elsewhere, the paranoia of elites here 
reveals how precious heterosexual sexual innocence is insofar as it is 
manufactured through scenes like this, as an always-terrorized, embodied 
identity that needs constantly to be on guard, prepared to fight back with 
 
on the narrower issue of sexual object choice. The differentiation of homosexual desire from 
cross-gender behavior at the turn of the century reflects a major reconceptualization of the 
nature of human sexuality, its relation to gender, and its role in one’s social definition.’”) 
(quoting George Chauncey, Jr., From Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality: The Changing 
Medical Conception of Female “Deviance”, in PASSION & POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY 
87, 88 (Kathy Peiss & Christina Simmons eds., 1989)). 
 9 Wittingly or not, this male-female fungibility may be a complex and highly 
contingent form of neoliberal fungibility. It is, after all, an argument that surfaces in the 
context of workers working within the economic machine and is even on the side of 
management (capital). That said, the logics here do seem to depend on norms that don’t 
originate “within” market rationality, but rather “outside” it, whether in nature or as Bursch’s 
client roughly characterized it, among “God[’s ]given gift[s].” EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599, 1599 
(2019) (mem.) (“Rost avers that he ‘sincerely believe[s] that the Bible teaches that a person’s 
sex is an immutable God-given gift.’”). For one cut into this, see the incisive and far-reaching 
reflections in SHANNON WINNUBST, WAY TOO COOL: SELLING OUT RACE AND ETHICS 118 
(2015) (“[G]ender in the mainstream culture of the United States has become a kind of 
playground for the neoliberal social rationality, offering up superficial spaces that are easily 
evacuated of any historical meanings and that are thus served up for endless self-
enhancement and manipulation.”), and id. at 118–31 (additional related argument). For 
another cut, consider the study of the complex relations between neoliberal rationalist 
economic fungibility projects as they interface with religious and moral traditionalism as that 
interface is precisely and surprisingly traced in Amy J. Cohen, Moral Restorative Justice: A 
Political Genealogy of Activism and Neoliberalism in the United States, 104 MINN. L. REV. 
889, 894, 903, 931–53 (2019) (tracing “distinctively moral form[s] of neoliberalism” in the 
context of certain “restorative justice” discourses and practices). The easy point and locus 
classicus for homosexuality’s function as a regulatory category is MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 43 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978) 
(1976) (“The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and 
a childhood . . . the homosexual was now a species.”).  
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ferocious, even lethal, zeal against the sources of its own terrorization.10 Not 
coincidentally, the shower scene also illustrates how profoundly heterosexuality 
is soaked in guilty terrors of sexual violence and harm, with that guilt—no doubt 
chiefly relating to cis-straight men’s manifest sexual violence against women 
across the expanse of social life—projected outward and onto thoughts of sexual 
and gender “others” who would present themselves, even if only in the 
heterosexualized imagination, naked and in proximity to heterosexual bodies in 
ways that sexualize the encounters, and, in the process, wash sex difference 
amidst the sexual violence they figuratively entail, out.11  
This being the case, here’s an insight into why, in the face of imaginary 
prospects of gay male and trans female sexual predation, some straight cis-men 
and cis-women may identify themselves with one another as the potential 
victims of these fungible “others” whose own sexual and gender differences 
likewise disappear. The shower scene, constructed this way, points to the 
prospect that, despite initial appearances of differences between them, the trans 
shower scene, which is normatively prior to the gay male shower scene in the 
LGBT Title VII sex discrimination cases, bears uncanny resemblances in a 
genealogy to its historical antecedent. If this is not to figure one as the copy of 
the other, it does suggests they are both part of a composite photonegative in 
which the shower scene supplies an urgent, present-tense, but historically-
grounded vision featuring a variable nonnormative queer “other” capable of 
materializing in different forms, and moving back and forth between them, 
while stalking and harming poor heterosexuals, all of whom still need relief and 
release from the sexual threat that queers pose if sex difference—and the social 
order built atop it—are to survive. Notably invisible within this negative—and 
undiscussed at oral arguments—are the full array of material mind-body dangers 
faced by trans people themselves in showers and locker rooms, which not 
uncommonly lead to safety-based closeting, a practice that lesbians and gay 
men, too, have undertaken in their own ways and for their own reasons in and 
across time.12 The full array of material mind-body dangers and injuries that cis-
 
 10 This is not in any way to overlook the material terrorization by cis-heterosexual men 
of cis-heterosexual women. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal 
Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1049–50, 1052–59 (1992) 
(discussing the “terrorization” of the cis-female body). The vast literature on cis-
heterosexual women’s injuries at the hands of cis-heterosexual men offer volumes of 
irrefutable testimony on this. See generally, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. 
WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010). 
 11 Both Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983), and CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and 
Power (1983), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 46 (1987), contain 
and generate important reasons for remaining deeply skeptical about the fungibility actually 
being that in ways that wash out all of its material sex-specificities.  
 12 See, e.g., SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE 
REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 154–55 (Dec. 2016), https://www.transe 
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women confront at the hands of cis-heterosexual men are likewise not available 
within it. 
In a sense, it is surprising that the shower scene makes any appearance in 
Gerald Bostock and Donald Zarda’s Title VII sex discrimination cases. Neither 
Bostock’s case, which involved an “award-winning advocate[] for child 
services” who maintained he was fired from his job for being gay after “he began 
participating in a gay recreational softball league,” nor Zarda’s, which involved 
a skydiving instructor who maintained he was fired after coming out to a young 
woman on the job in order “to assuage any concern” that she “might have about 
being strapped to a man for a tandem skydive,” involved anyone showering, 
much less in the “wrong” shower.13 Nevertheless, the shower scene is 
introduced in arguments in their cases and plays an important role in them, if 
not so predominant a role as in Aimee Stephens’s case. Looking ahead, the 
shower scene is as significant in the sexual identity cases as it is, in part, because 
of what it helps to teach about the dynamics of the cultural thinking that’s 
happening around it and what that can do in turn to help illuminate the cultural 
dynamics at work in Stephens’s case as well.  
The shower scene makes one single prominent appearance in the course of 
the defense’s oral argument against Bostock and Zarda’s claims that anti-gay 
discrimination is sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.14 As in Stephens’s 
 
quality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/9YP7-
W8H8] (noting responses of respondents who took steps to avoid discrimination including 
hiding gender identity at work). 
 13 Brief in Opposition at 2, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 (Aug. 16, 
2018) [hereinafter Zarda Brief in Opposition]; see Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, 
Bostock v. Clayton Cty.; and Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623 (Oct. 
8, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/17-
1618_b97c.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TZZ-FHMR] [hereinafter Bostock Transcript] (“award-
winning advocates for child services”); Brief for Petitioner at 5–6, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 
No. 17-1618 (June 26, 2019) (discussing background of Bostock’s termination); Zarda Brief 
in Opposition, supra, at 2–3 (discussing background of Zarda’s termination).  
 14 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 48–49. References to it in the briefing in the 
case include Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc., and Ray Maynard at 55, Altitude 
Express, Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 (Aug. 16, 2019) [hereinafter Zarda Brief for Petitioners] 
(“That view overthrows important, long-standing employment policies and practices. These 
include sex-specific policies for determining access to living facilities, sleeping quarters, 
restrooms, showers, and locker rooms; fitness tests for police, fire, and similar positions; and 
organizational dress and grooming standards.”); Brief for Respondent at 8–9, Bostock v. 
Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618 (Aug. 16, 2019) (“[S]ex discrimination [claims] cannot be 
analyzed identically as race discrimination claims . . . different treatment of men and women 
with respect to . . . privacy spaces (such as overnight facilities, locker rooms, restrooms and 
showers) [have been upheld], whereas no such differences based on race would be 
tolerated.”); see also Zarda Brief for Petitioners, supra, at 11 (Zarda’s view “actually forbids 
employers from distinguishing between the sexes or even considering sex at work[,]” and 
“would topple sex-specific policies—such as restroom and locker-room access, fitness tests, 
and dress codes—and jeopardize the important interests that those policies advance.”); id. at 
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case, the shower scene receives pride of place at a key moment in the defense’s 
presentation: right at the tail end, or what was mistakenly believed to be the tail 
end, of the argument.15 Approximate timestamp: shortly before arguments in 
Stephens’s case begin. 
Setting the stage for the shower’s appearance, the legal position that 
Pamela S. Karlan, of Stanford Law School, was making on behalf of Bostock 
and Zarda, was a stylized, but ultimately straightforward, doctrinal inquiry. Its 
structure importantly sutured their cases to Stephens’s trans sex-discrimination 
case while also providing a mechanism for differentiating between and among 
them. The test for Title VII sex discrimination that Karlan offered included two 
steps.16 The first asked whether a plaintiff in any given sex discrimination case 
suffered discrimination because of his or her sex.17 Here, Karlan relied on the 
standard doctrinal machinery that the Supreme Court had constructed in earlier 
Title VII sex discrimination cases, dating back to Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power v. Manhart.18 This inquiry is the familiar-in-this-setting “but-
for sex” test: Would the plaintiff have suffered the discrimination that he or she 
experienced “but for” their sex? This inquiry, Karlan urged, should be followed 
by another to determine whether legally actionable sex discrimination took 
place. Henceforth, it would be necessary to show that a “reasonable person” in 
the plaintiff’s situation would find themselves injured when they are 
discriminated against because of, or “but-for,” his or her sex.19 This insists a 
plaintiff must not simply experience but must suffer sex-based discrimination. 
Bracketing some important questions and challenges, the elegant simplicity 
of this test, such as it is, is partly found in how it enables legal decision-makers 
to engage in what may be described as social identity-based legal tailoring. To 
illustrate the operation of Karlan’s argument, a gay man, as a man, is easily seen 
to experience sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII if he is not allowed to 
dress as a woman at work or to use the ladies’ restroom there (“but for” being a 
 
59 (“Most Americans—including people of faith, business owners, and anyone who uses 
sex-specific restrooms or locker-room facilities—will be affected by this ruling.”). 
 15 See infra text accompanying note 24 (“and the last point, running out of time . . .”), 
which was followed by additional exchanges, including those noted infra text accompanying 
notes 25–31. The relevant pages of the transcript are Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 
48–52. 
 16 David Cole endorsed this theory at oral argument on Aimee Stephens’s behalf. See 
Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 6, at 4–6, 8–13, 15–17; see also Reply Brief 
for Respondent Aimee Stephens at 6, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 
No. 18-107 (Sept. 10, 2019) (same). 
 17 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 15 (“My test says that you have treated the 
people differently because of sex, which is what we are asking you to hold here. When you 
treat a gay man who wants to date a woman differently than a man -- woman who wants to 
date a woman, that -- that’s discrimination.”). 
 18 City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 19 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 15 (“Then you get to what I’ve said, which is 
you have to ask whether a reasonable person under these circumstances would be injured by 
the imposition of the particular sex-specific world.”). 
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man, meaning: if he were a woman, he would affirmatively have been allowed 
to do these things).20 A reasonable gay man, however, would presumably not 
find sex discriminations like these to be injurious and so might not state a 
successful Title VII sex discrimination claim if required by an employer to dress 
as a man or to use the men’s room.21 A similarly situated trans woman under 
those circumstances, by contrast, would be both like and unlike the gay male 
plaintiff. Like the gay man, she would be discriminated against because of sex 
if she were barred from dressing as a woman at work under sex-specific dress 
standards or from using the ladies’ restroom there (“but for” the sex she was 
assigned at birth, male, she would be allowed to do these things). But, unlike a 
reasonable gay man, a reasonable trans woman would find sex discrimination 
like this injurious, since it would keep her from being herself and living openly 
as herself at work.22 
Challenging this position, Jeffrey M. Harris, for the defense, proposed that 
Karlan’s theory was hardly the circumscribed rule Karlan made it out to be in 
her account. This is Harris quickly responding to a question from Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh before thinking and giving audible voice to his inner sense that the 
clock is about to expire on his argument. Time-pressured, Harris pivots to make 
one last, apparently important point before sitting down. Like Bursch’s 
deployment of “the restroom scenario” soon would, Harris’s invocation of what 
 
 20 See id. at 15–17 (providing context for the point, including the observation by 
Karlan that “[a]n idiosyncratic preference does not void an otherwise valid dress code or 
bathroom rule”). Textured discussion of the point is in Reply Brief for Respondents at at 19–
21 Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 (Sept. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Zarda Reply 
Brief], which includes the notation that “the issue in each case involving sex-specific policies 
will be whether the employer’s sex-differentiated treatment has injured the plaintiff,” and 
the observation that, “if a court concludes that the employer’s provision of separate restrooms 
is ‘innocuous’ as to the individuals who have sued, it will find no violation of Title VII.” Id. 
at 20. Along similar lines is an amicus brief, cited approvingly by Zarda’s reply brief, Zarda 
Reply Brief, supra, at 20–21, which maintains that: “Providing equal but sex-segregated 
restrooms in the workplace would not materially reinforce invidious sex-based stereotypes 
nor otherwise appreciably harm the vast majority of male or female employees, many of 
whom would, in fact, prefer not to use restrooms together with persons of the opposite sex—
and therefore it would not ‘discriminate against’ such employees for purposes of Subsection 
703(a)(1).” Brief for Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 24–25, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107 (July 
3, 2019). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg echoed this point during oral arguments. See infra 
text accompanying note 27; see also infra note 21. 
 21 As Justice Ginsburg, clarifying, explains: “And the response to the bathrooms is 
who is the complaining plaintiff? And for most people, they would not be [the] complaining 
plaintiff. They would not be eligible because they’re not injured by the separate bathrooms. 
In fact, they like it.” Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 48. Gay men are presumably in 
this group.  
 22 Id. at 16–17 (“JUSTICE GORSUCH: Is it idiosyncratic for a transgender person to 
prefer a bathroom that’s different than the -- the one of their biological sex? . . . MS. 
KARLAN: No.”). 
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he dubs the “bathroom[] . . . standard[]” involves a ladies’ shower.23 Quoting 
from the Court’s official transcript: 
MR. HARRIS: I don’t see a difference between the two as far as -- and -- and 
the last point, running out of time, I think to go back to some of the questions 
about bathrooms and fitness standards, I want to be clear, under the Plaintiff’s 
simple but-for test, if you truly simply apply the Manhart [“but-for”] test or -- 
in the way they want to do it, I don’t see any way that single-sex bathrooms or 
showering facilities . . . [.]24 
In saying this, Harris indicates he is going to return to “some of the questions 
about bathrooms and fitness standards,” but the ultimate focus in these remarks, 
which is about to narrow further still, is on “single-sex bathrooms or showering 
facilities.”25 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stops Harris before he can continue in order to 
correct his presentation of Karlan’s doctrinal test.26 Justice Ginsburg 
underscores Karlan’s point about “injury”—would a reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s situation be injured by the sex discrimination being claimed?— three 
times in quick succession, as if to ensure Harris cannot possibly miss the point 
again. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: You have to have someone who’s injured. You have 
to have someone who’s injured. And the response to the bathrooms is who is 
the complaining plaintiff? And for most people, they would not be [the] 
complaining plaintiff. They would not be eligible because they’re not injured 
by the separate bathrooms. In fact, they like it.27 
In offering these thoughts, Justice Ginsburg completely ignores Harris’s 
mention of “showering facilities.”28 Her remarks focus exclusively on 
bathrooms in their traditional sense and who wants to go in them, and then, 
having been refused, claims sex discrimination. 
No sooner does Justice Ginsburg offer her thinking than Harris shoots back, 
carefully pulling discussion back to, to elaborate upon, the shower scene he has 
in mind, which, in passing, he refers to as being about “the women’s 
bathroom”29: 
 
 23 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 6, at 45 (“the restroom scenario”); 
Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 48 (“bathroom[] . . . standard[]”). For discussion of the 
“women’s shower,” see infra text accompanying note 30. 
 24 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 48. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 49.  
142 THE SHOWER’S RETURN: PART V [Vol. 81  
MR. HARRIS: Yes, Your Honor, although, of course, if someone, for example, 
is fired, imagine a factory with hazardous materials where people shower after 
work and to -- to clean up, and a -- a man used the women’s bathroom and is 
fired. That person would certainly be injured. And I think, under my friend’s 
test, they would say just change the sex and that person wouldn’t have been 
fired.  
     But here’s the problem: That’s not a similarly situated person. The proper 
analysis would say that a neutral policy, such as use the showering facility that 
corresponds to your biological sex, the man who uses the women’s shower, the 
-- the comparator is not a woman who uses the woman’s shower. It’s a woman 
who uses the men’s shower, because otherwise you’re not -- otherwise you’re 
-- you’re loading the dice or you’re not looking at similarly situated people.30  
Formally, Harris’s argument utterly fails to track Justice Ginsburg’s basic point 
and the vital doctrinal work the reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation 
standard does within Karlan’s argument. In this sense, and on one level, Harris’s 
answer is a bust.31 
On an entirely different plane, however, Harris has in fact subtly offered a 
deep reply to the case Karlan has made, with its two-step doctrinal test, as well 
as Justice Ginsburg’s observations about it. Harris is saying that he is certain 
that if the Supreme Court provides the statutory anti-discrimination protections 
that Karlan is asking it to, the Court would, in effect, be providing protections 
to, hence legitimating and normalizing, the shower scene’s sex-based harms. 
What harms, exactly, does Harris have in mind in saying this? Interestingly, 
his account of the shower scene is ambiguous on a central element. Saying this 
isn’t primarily about how, in his haste, Harris neglects to say there are any cis-
women in the shower he’s describing when the “man” he describes showing up 
there shows up. Rather, it’s to notice that Harris has not explained, and has thus 
left blurred and out of focus, who the man is who shows up in that shower. 
What’s his gender and/or sexual orientation? Harris leaves this part out. 
 
 30 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 48–49. 
 31 According to Martha Chamallas: 
     Karlan’s definition of injury (that a reasonable person would regard defendant’s 
action as an injury) does not have much grounding in Title VII law. Usually we think 
about the injury requirement in Title VII as deriving from the statutory requirement that 
the defendant’s conduct must alter the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment, 
the so-called “adverse action” requirement. Adverse actions are concrete, usually 
official steps, taken by the employer, such as terminations, transfers, etc. Thus, it is not 
surprising that Harris would try to pivot and focus on the firing of a man who used the 
women’s restroom. He was clumsily making the point that injury relates to the firing 
and not to whether the injured person reasonably felt aggrieved. 
Email from Martha Chamallas, Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, Michael E. Moritz Coll. of 
Law, The Ohio State Univ., to Marc Spindelman, Isadore and Ida Topper Professor of Law, 
Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State Univ. (May 22, 2020, 9:37 AM) (on file 
with author). 
2020] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 143 
Normally, the invocation of the unmarked category “man” in a setting like 
this, which Harris carries through the full stitch of his point, might be taken as 
properly filled up by thinking about “man” in his conventional, normative sense. 
It’s possible, of course, that Harris was warning the Court about how it could be 
opening the door to a cis-straight man “sneakily” entering the ladies’ shower, 
getting fired, then legally complaining he suffered sex discrimination bound up 
with the adverse employment action of his firing as his injury.32  
To understand Harris’s point this way introduces an important and novel 
element into the shower scene. It might be that the shower scene is actually 
about no one other than cis-straight men and their own normative cross-sex 
sexual proclivities being brought into the wrong place, making it non-normative 
in this sense, these men, and nobody else, being women’s real enemies in the 
showers where they, and nobody else, are the “foxes” who sexually want to 
invade these “henhouses” and who must be kept out lest women be sexually 
harmed.33 
Seen this way, cis-straight men—who may initially appear as victims, hence 
objects, in the photonegative—may be its actual subjects: the persons who this 
whole sordid business about the ladies’ shower is really about and has been 
about all along, with some straight men’s own inner desires, projected onto 
others, being what everyone who is fretting is, finally, fretting about.34 If so, the 
 
 32 Ezra Ishmael Young, What the Supreme Court Could Have Heard in R.G. & G.R. 
Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC and Aimee Stephens, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 32 (2020) 
(Cole’s “answer conjured an image of men sneakily fighting for the right to enter women’s 
restrooms, the worst possible terrain”). 
 33 Possibilities of cis-heterosexual male predation are suggested, inter alia, in RYAN 
T. ANDERSON, WHEN HARRY BECAME SALLY: RESPONDING TO THE TRANSGENDER 
MOVEMENT 186–90 (2018), and the Brief for Women’s Liberation Front and Family Policy 
Alliance as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel 
Grimm, No. 16-273 (Jan. 10, 2017) (insisting on the argument holding “[t]hat any man can 
justify his presence in any women’s restroom, locker room, or shower by saying ‘I identify 
as a woman’ will not escape the notice of those who already harass, assault, and rape tens of 
thousands of women every day”) (italics in original). See also Sheila Jeffreys, The Politics 
of the Toilet: A Feminist Response to the Campaign to ‘Degender’ a Woman’s Space, 45 
WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 42, 48 (2014) (“women are sitting ducks for assault”). Jeffreys, 
ultimately rejecting the argument others have made, notes the possibility of its reversal thus: 
“A gender-neutral bathroom, according to this logic, would make women safer from assault 
by men because of the presence of men [really: transwomen].” Id. One version of this 
argument—affirmatively offered in the context of venturing a case for urinary integration—
is in Case, supra note 2, at 221 (observing that “the potential expected presence of both sexes 
in an integrated restroom could also on occasion act as a deterrent, by decreasing the 
likelihood a perpetrator will be alone with his intended victim and increasing the chances a 
bystander able and willing to offer aid will be present”).  
 34 Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, R.G. & G.R. Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 
No. 18-107 (Oct. 8, 2019) (“Anyone—not just those with ‘medical diagnoses’—can profess 
a gender identity that conflicts with their sex. And as Stephens admitted during deposition, 
if an employer allows a male employee ‘to present as a woman,’ it must permit him to ‘go[] 
back to present[ing] as a man later on.’”) (alteration in original). 
144 THE SHOWER’S RETURN: PART V [Vol. 81  
photonegative, on close inspection, might provide evidence that inculpates cis-
heterosexual men while exonerating trans women. Understanding Harris’s 
remarks this way brings sex difference back into the scene, and with a 
vengeance: “Man” and “woman” here are very different from one another, 
“man” (that’s cis-hetero man) being “woman’s” (that’s cis-hetero woman’s) 
enemy. More importantly perhaps, if this is right, Harris’s argument offers up 
reasons for stopping cis-heterosexual men, women’s natural sexual tormenters, 
by excluding them from Title VII sex discrimination protections, an argument 
that Harris has not otherwise sought to make. What would this mean for straight 
men who are actually sexually injured by other straight men—in showers or 
anywhere else?35 
Treated as grounded in a vision of cis-heterosexual male sexual predation, 
Harris’s argument is a striking declaration against interest that releases and may 
even temporarily abandon its focus on the pro-gay and the pro-trans arguments 
Karlan offered to the Court. Thinking that cannot be the whole story, especially 
recognizing that Harris’s argument is meant a block against those claims, it 
makes sense to regard Harris’s description of the shower scene as involving a 
“man” who is a gay man going in the ladies’ shower or a trans woman going in 
there, misrepresenting her in the misgendered, male-identified terms Bursch 
would later use.36 Here the shower scene performs gay/trans fungibility, 
specifically gay male/trans female fungibility, to a fare-thee-well.37 
Recognizing that all of these possibilities are practically in play, it may not 
be necessary to adjudicate between or among them. Precisely because Harris’s 
remarks involve these combinations—making it in a sense undecidable who this 
“man” in the ladies’ shower in the hazardous materials facility is—they expose 
an important dimension of the shower’s threat as cultural trope.  
What that is, is found deep within an account provided by Kendall Thomas’s 
brief and nearly perfect essay on the gays-in-the-military shower scene 
published as the debates on openly gay military service in the 1990s were 
themselves “raging the country.”38 
 
 35 This kind of claim was in fact involved in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), where Joseph Oncale, the cis-straight male plaintiff in the case, 
maintained as part of his larger sexual harassment claim that he suffered an attempted rape 
in a shower. See Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al. at 
2–4, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568) 
(describing in the “statement of facts” that “[t]hat same night, Lyons and Pippen attempted 
to rape Oncale as he was taking a shower”). For some discussion of Oncale and its relation 
to sex equality concerns, see Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 1 (2004). 
 36 See, e.g., Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 6, at 45 (“You could have a 
male employee who identifies as a woman but doesn’t dress as a woman, looks like a 
man . . . .”). 
 37 From a nonbinaristic perspective on sex, of course, it involves male/female 
fungibility, as well. 
 38 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 12; Kendall Thomas, Shower/Closet, 20 
ASSEMBLAGE 80 (1993). 
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Thomas’s essay, entitled “Shower/Closet,” delivers an incisive analysis of 
the gays-in-the-military shower scene that corrects once-conventional thinking 
holding that that scene’s import chiefly or exclusively involved its “scopic” 
possibilities: the prospects that gay men would be casting sexually-aggressive 
masculine gazes upon straight men’s naked bodies in showers in ways that—as 
acts or symbols of sexual domination and violation—would strip those straight 
male troops of their masculinity, thereby, consistent with sex-binaristic 
thinking, reducing these erstwhile rough, tough, lean, mean, straight, American 
male “killing machine[s]” into states of feminine submission, which might, the 
wild-eyed cultural logics suggested, lead to America’s military defeat.39 Think: 
The Rape of America. It’s impossible to miss the idea of cis-heterosexual 
male/cis-heterosexual female fungibility that surfaces at just this point. 
Recognizing these dynamics and how they operated within the symbolic 
economy of the military shower scene, “Shower/Closet” takes up the challenge 
of explaining how this scene vitally involved a different, if ultimately not 
unrelated, prospect of heterosexual men’s sexual ruin. There was, after all, 
nothing formally new about men with same-sex desires being in military 
showers. Everyone in the military knew or had to know that men-desiring-men 
had long been in the showers lusting after those strong, muscular, wet, lathered-
up, masculine bodies while thinking about the very good or very bad things they 
would like to do to them.40 Understood as a scene about gay male sexual 
predation, of male dominance—decidedly not a scene involving gay men’s 
desires for their own subordination at the hands of straight male troops playing 
the part of “rough trade”—the injunctions against gay men’s “out” military 
service functioned as a way to police gay men and force them to police 
themselves, keeping their desires and the minor movements of their desiring 
bodies firmly in check, operating “very, very discreet[ly],” on pain not simply 
of separation from service by means of dishonorable discharges, but also 
possibly nothing less than violent—even lethal—reprisals by straight troops 
who would, singularly or in a group, manifest straight male unit cohesion to 
fight unto death to get their own alpha masculinity back.41 What this effectively 
meant—other than perhaps exposing fears of homosexual alpha dogs as both 
projection and sheer nonsense, they being emphatically and readily brought to 
heel in these ways, politically powerless on their own to stop it—was that the 
injunction against gay men openly serving in the military was part of the 
construction of a law-based military closet, which functioned to allow straight 
 
 39 Thomas, supra note 38, at 80 (“scopic” possibilities); id. (“killing machines”). The 
proposal here is that “the scopophobia of straight male troops evidenced in recent media 
accounts [should be read] as the displaced expression of an epistemophobia or fear of 
knowledge which, by its very terms, its victims refuse to know.” Id. 
 40 Id. (“The ex-Navy Captain began by noting that ‘we all know’ that ‘we’ve been able 
to live with homosexuals in our military quite well.’”). 
 41 Id. (“The Colonel defended the ban because it had forced gay men and lesbians in 
the armed forces ‘to be very, very discreet, to stay in the closet, so that no one knew that 
their conduct didn’t become a matter of command attention or public attention.’”). 
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male troops to enjoy their all-male, homosocial showering and even the 
homosocial hijinks that could take place in the showers, while being protected 
by a “privilege of unknowing” about the fantasies that gay men might still be 
actively harboring about them.42 
 “Shower/Closet” thus proposes that the stakes of the shower scene were not 
simply or even primarily about gay men’s glances, stolen or otherwise, whether 
understood as acts or representations of other acts of sexual domination and 
violation. On an elemental level, the shower scene was about the social 
conditions of knowledge, about epistemology in this sense: what straight men 
knew, or got to know, or, more exactly, got to not know, when being in or 
moving through the shower as a distinctive social-architectural space.43 The ban 
on gay men openly serving in the military ensured that straight troops could 
continue enjoying the luxury of not knowing about what gay men might be 
thinking about them. To lift the ban on gay men openly serving in the military 
would thus strip straight men of psychic-epistemic armor they had long enjoyed, 
perhaps unnoticed, forcing them to know—and to have to confront knowing—
what they could previously never think or think seriously about. Gay men, 
legally freed to be out and themselves, might stop doing what they had been 
doing furtively. They and their male-body-focused sexual desires would 
henceforth be liberated, out in the open, including in the shower, under the 
protection of a legal right.  
Accordingly, “Shower/Closet” reveals that the closet did not only involve 
its famous function of being the site for the production and maintenance of an 
oppressed and shamed gay male identity and same-sex desires.44 Critically and 
crucially, the closet was also “the generative site of masculinist heterosexual 
identity.”45 Holding this formative meaning for gay male identity and straight 
male identity, the elimination of the closet that gay troops were forced to occupy 
might be a net good and source of freedom for them, but it would also, 
 
 42 Id. at 81 (“The presence of ‘avowed’ homosexuals in the military would strip the 
straight troop of his ‘privilege of unknowing,’ leaving him naked to confront the disavowal 
of homosexual desire on which the homosocial apparatus of the military so crucially 
depends.”) (citation omitted). On homosocial hijinks, see id. (noting, with Alan Bérubé’s 
“history of gay men and lesbians in World War II,” “the importance of homosexualized ritual 
in male military culture,” including “ ‘homosexual buffoonery,’ a game in which a G.I. 
would play the role of ‘company queer,’” and then describing this play). 
 43 Id. As Thomas put it: “[T]he ban debate is not so much a conflict over what can(not) 
be seen, as it is a controversy over what can(not) be known.” Id. at 80 (italics in original). 
 44 Id. (describing “the closet [a]s the ‘defining structure of gay oppression in this 
century’”). On gay shame, GAY SHAME (David M. Halperin & Valerie Traub eds., 2009), is 
an indispensable resource. So, at the same time, are J. Halberstam, Shame and White Gay 
Masculinity, 23 SOC. TEXT 219 (2005), and Hiram Perez, You Can Have My Brown Body 
and Eat It, Too!, 23 SOC. TEXT 171 (2005). 
 45 Thomas, supra note 38, at 80. 
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simultaneously, be a net evil and source of unfreedom for straight male troops.46 
The homosocial shower, up to that point “the straight male shower,” would 
cease being that the moment the ban on open military service by gay men 
ended.47 And so, “Shower/Closet” crucially instructs that “the straight male 
shower” was neither an “opposing nor even abutting structure[]” in relation to 
the closet.48 “The shower and the closet occupy the same psychic space.”49 
Hence the “Shower/Closet” as the title of the work. 
“Shower/Closet” proceeds to describe the resulting threat to heterosexual 
men attendant upon lifting the ban on gay men openly serving in the military. 
The threat of lifting the ban on gay men’s open military service involves straight 
male troops being thrown into a new relation to knowledge that inevitably 
figured the prospects of psychic turmoil and/or distress. The essay chooses not 
to characterize this in the traditional registers of gay panic, but rather in the 
related terms of what the essay dubs a “‘wonder’ or epistemic panic.”50 
“Wonder” here carries the meaning not of awe, but of uncertainty, vulnerability, 
anxiety, puzzlement, confusion, even discombobulation, perhaps also nausea 
and disgust. “Epistemic panic” refers to the panic of knowing what one 
previously did not know.  
Campily and wonderfully, the essay places a folksy account of “‘wonder’ 
or epistemic panic” in the mouth of a seaman who is quoted as talking publicly 
about the “fear[] that ‘if these people are allowed to come out of the closet, I’ll 
be serving aboard a ship and wondering who’s who and what’s what.’”51 In this 
form, the “‘wonder’ or epistemic panic” of the shower/closet was not, the essay 
warns, “likely to confine itself to questions about the masculinity of the 
 
 46 This thinking about the closet’s meaning for male heterosexuality may help shed 
light on rhetorical gestures that frame legal, including constitutional, advances in the form 
of lesbian and gay liberation as types of closeting oppression—for others. See, e.g., 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642–43 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I assume that 
those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their 
homes, but if they repeat those views in public they will risk being labeled as bigots and 
treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.”). 
 47 Thomas, supra note 38, at 80. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 81. 
 51 Id. (quoting Larry Rohter, Off Base, Many Sailors Voice Anger Toward 
Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at 20, https://www.nytimes.com/1993 
/01/31/us/the-gay-troop-issue-off-base-many-sailors-voice-anger-toward-homosexuals.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZGL7-YZUQ]). The full quotation of this “32-year-old tugboat master” in 
the New York Times reads: “A sea command now would mean I’m compromised. Privacy is 
almost nil when you go out to sea for six months, and if these people are allowed to come 
out of the closet, I’ll be serving aboard a ship and wondering who’s who and what’s what.” 
Larry Rohter, Off Base, Many Sailors Voice Anger Toward Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
31, 1993, at 20, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/31/us/the-gay-troop-issue-off-base-
many-sailors-voice-anger-toward-homosexuals.html [https://perma.cc/ZGL7-YZUQ].  
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homosexual Other.”52 It was not likely to confine itself to being about what gay 
men were doing. Turning inward, the “‘wonder’ or epistemic panic” raised 
difficult, perhaps excruciating, maybe even devastating, questions for 
heterosexual troops themselves about nothing less than their own 
heterosexuality and masculinity. As the essay explains: “Given the homoerotic 
dimensions of male military culture, the straight troop might well be compelled 
to come to terms with the fragile and fluid nature of his own sexual and gender 
identities.”53 Eliminate the closet, which would by necessity eliminate the “the 
straight male shower,” and the stage was set for a shower scene with gay men 
in which heterosexual manhood—both as to its sexual and gender 
components—was at risk of coming undone.54 Straight men could no longer be 
able to know with certainty about themselves or about anyone else “who’s who 
and what’s what.”55 Male heterosexuality as a grounding psychic force, 
unraveled, undone, would leave straight male troops in a panic of wonder and 
not knowing.56 
Read against the backdrop of this analysis, Harris’s anxious rush during 
what he believed to be the final moments of his argument toward a 
representation of a hazardous materials factory’s ladies’ shower inhabited by a 
man whose “sexual and gender identit[y]” remained out of focus looks like an 
indication that Harris—whether he precisely intended it or not—understood that 
the logics of the shower scene can involve the unraveling of the ordinary sexual 
and gender precisions of “man.”57 
Harris’s remarks were scarcely the only sign of psychic experiences of 
wonder and its attendant disorientation circulating in the sexual identity cases. 
Earlier on, during an exchange between Justice Samuel Alito and Pamela 
Karlan, for instance, Justice Alito offered a wonderfully frank description of his 
own experiences encountering the various arguments being made by the parties 
to the gay sex-discrimination cases. Clarifying an “argument” he was making, 
Justice Alito remarked: “And your core -- the -- the parties have in their briefs, 
have all of these comparisons, and they will make your head spin if you -- if you 
try to figure them all out.”58 This account of having studied “all of these 
comparisons” in the parties briefs winds up sounding like a report that echoes 
 
 52 Thomas, supra note 38, at 81. 
 53 Id. Here may be a sign of the power of sexuality described by Shannon Winnubst 
as “[l]ocated in the Lacanian register of the real (or what we might call the drive in the 
Freudian schema)” as “fundamentally chaotic, turbulent, disordered, and disordering.” 
WINNUBST, supra note 9, at 139. 
 54 Thomas, supra note 38, at 80. 
 55 Id. at 81. 
 56 Id. (“When the straight male troop walks into the shower room in the future, he will 
do so in the knowledge that he has been driven out of his own closet.”). 
 57 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 48–52. In actuality, as the transcript shows, 
Harris’s time went on longer than that. Id. The language of “sexual and gender identit[y]” 
comes from Thomas, supra note 38, at 81. 
 58 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 28–29. 
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that seaman’s fears about what would happen were the ban on open gay military 
service to be lifted: doing his job, he’d be there looking around “wondering 
who’s who and what’s what.”59 
Sexual and gender confusions—or gender and sexual confusions, either 
way—also emerged during oral arguments in some classically Freudian ways. 
This is U.S. Solicitor General Noel Francisco speaking shortly after Harris 
brought up the shower scene, until he found it necessary to stop and correct 
himself: “[S]ex means whether you’re male or female, not whether you’re gay 
or straight. So if you treat all gay and men -- gay men and women exactly the 
same regardless of their sex, you’re not discriminating against them because of 
their sex.”60 Here Francisco’s remark has him, before his self-correction, 
casually saying what many people, not thinking about femme women-loving-
women, still sometimes think when they think of gay men and lesbians: “gay 
[men] and men.”61 And this slip-o-the-tongue happened even after an earlier 
exchange in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor expressly warned against the 
erroneous confusions by which one might be led to think that, “[i]f you’re too 
macho a woman, you’re a lesbian.”62 
The amusement that gender and sexual confusion can generate likewise 
received a share of intentional play in the arguments. Gender neutrality—a form 
of gender imprecision that can at times lead to confusion—was repeatedly 
performed in the courtroom in ways meant to produce laughs.63 Responding to 
 
 59 Thomas, supra note 38, at 81. One illuminating, generous, politically powerful, and 
beautiful way of recognizing why “[t]he sheer variety of trans bodies and genders” can 
sometimes feel excessive and even challenge one’s “cognitive capacity to comprehend them” 
identifies this feeling of “[f]eeling overwhelmed” as an “experience of the sublime.” 
T. Benjamin Singer, From the Medical Gaze to Sublime Mutations: The Ethics of 
(Re)Viewing Non-Normative Body Images, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 601, 616 
(Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006). Singer likewise indexes “shutting down” as 
a “form of psychical protection against the terror of boundary collapse at the edge of 
limitlessness.” Id. 
 60 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 53. Mentioning when the remarks surfaced is 
strictly meant as a temporal observation, not a causal claim, which is not to deny that one 
might be made, only to say none is being made here. 
 61 Id. (emphasis added). 
 62 Id. at 50. SIGMUND FREUD, JOKES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS (J. 
Strachey trans., 1960), remains the conventional starting point on parapraxes. 
 63 For a related way of speaking to these problematics that traces what’s figured as the 
problem of “transgender ideology” to its “roots in gender theory and in certain strains of 
feminist thinking about our embodiment,” consider: 
First-wave feminism was a campaign to liberate women from an overly restrictive 
concept of gender, so they could be free to fulfill their nature, but it gave way to a 
movement seeking to make women identical to men. From the error of inflexible 
stereotypes, our culture swung to the opposite error of denying any important 
differences between male and female. The result is a culture of androgyny and 
confusion.  
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Karlan’s bet that Chief Justice John Roberts would address her opposing counsel 
as “Mr. Harris” when he stood to speak, the Chief Justice mischievously made 
a point of using a gender-neutral form of address to show that he was capable 
of taking Karlan’s money and treating her and Harris exactly alike.64 As Karlan 
stepped down and Harris stepped up to take the podium, the Chief Justice spoke 
thus: “CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: [To Karlan] Thank you, counsel. [Then to 
Harris:] Counsel.”65 This sex-neutral term of address—which pressed back 
against who Ms. Karlan and Mr. Harris were in sex-specific terms—prompted 
laughter in the courtroom, for which Chief Justice Roberts graciously 
apologized, “Sorry.”66 And well enough. No laughing matter, sex-neutrality has 
been both a lifework and a lifeline that has conduced to less sex discrimination 
and hence more sex equality and liberty as matters of statutory and 
constitutional right.67 Without missing the chance to make his own play against 
sex neutrality and its imprecisions—he being, after all, very different from Ms. 
Karlan—counsel Harris began his presentation with a notably over-articulated, 
“Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.”68 Laugher ensuing, Justice 
Roberts replied, “Touché,” before Harris, having made his point, pressed on to 
the remainder of his argument, which flowed from his related understanding of 
Title VII’s definition of “sex” being tied to sex’s traditional truths.69 
 
ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 6; see also id. at 148 (making the same basic observation). For 
how sex-neutrality may precisely be an object of concern in some quarters, see Spindelman, 
The Showers Return, Part III, supra note 1, at 109 n.29. 
 64 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 12, 31 (“When I got up, the Chief Justice said 
to me, ‘Ms.’ Karlan, I am willing to bet any amount of money I have that when Mr. Harris 
gets up, he is going to say ‘Mr.’ Harris.”). 
 65 Id. at 31. 
 66 Id. A report on the moment from the courtroom is in Mark Walsh, A “View” from 
the Courtroom: Pop Culture and Protocol, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.scotus 
blog.com/2019/10/a-view-from-the-courtroom-pop-culture-and-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/ 
A8ZG-42TR] (“When it is time for Harris to begin his argument, the chief justice devilishly 
recognizes him by saying ‘Counsel’ instead of ‘Mr. Harris.’ As the courtroom erupts in 
laughter, Roberts says, ‘Sorry.’”). 
 67 See generally Wendy Webster Williams, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Rutgers 
Years: 1963–1972, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 229 (2010); Wendy W. Williams, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s Equal Protection Clause: 1970–80, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 41 (2013). For 
further discussion, see Spindelman, The Shower’s Return, Part III, supra note 1, at 108–09, 
109 nn.28–29. 
 68 Bostock Transcript, supra note 13, at 31 (emphasis added). 
 69 Id. at 31. For the traditional understanding of “sex” embraced and advanced by the 
defense in briefing in Bostock and Zarda’s cases, see Zarda Brief for Petitioners, supra note 
14, at 11–23 (discussing “original public meaning” of “sex” in Title VII and related argument 
about how it should be understood to operate in relation to Zarda’s Title VII sex 
discrimination claims); Brief for Respondent at 6, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618 
(Aug. 16, 2019) (“The original public meaning of ‘sex’ in 1964 was being male or female. 
This public meaning remains the same today.”); id. at 7–8 (discussing how this definition of 
“sex” works in the context of the sex stereotyping claim involved in the case); id. at 12–17 
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Reflecting back on these developments, how serious are these illustrations 
of gender and sexual confusion? How serious are these moments of the 
unconscious exposing itself? How serious are these jokes? 
Whatever the answers, these examples, from their different locations, reflect 
something important that was happening closer to—if not right at—the 
normative heart of the gay sex-discrimination cases as they were being argued 
at the Supreme Court. Though lesbians and gay men, unlike trans people, are 
now known figures at the Supreme Court, its doctrine now generally treating 
lesbians and gay men and their lives as fully constitutionally, hence legally, 
normative, it is still the case that thinking about gay men, at least in the context 
of arguments that also involve trans women, raised a specter of conventional 
strictures and structures of gender and sexuality coming undone.  
 
Indeed, as will become clear next time, gender imprecision—really gender 
confusion—about who’s who and what’s what in relation to gender and sexual 
identity showed up as an important argument from the Bench as a way to 




(discussing definition of “sex” under Title VII, and comparing it to definition of sexual 
orientation); id. at 36–40 (discussing “sex” in the context of a Title VII sex stereotyping 
claim). For some perspective on the role of laughter in LGBT civil rights litigation, see KENJI 
YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 105–06 (2007) 
(commenting, after describing courtroom laughter that erupted as “disbelieving mirth” 
during oral arguments in Lawrence v. Texas—laughter that functioned as a way of dismissing 
an anti-gay line of thought that Justice Antonin Scalia was expressing: “[o]ne way of tracking 
the gay rights movement is to listen to the laughter attending it[,]” and “[w]ho is laughing, 
and with what emotion, has changed very much, very quickly”). Thanks to Courtney Cahill 
for engagement on laughter. 
